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Economic Choices and Status: 
Measuring Preferences for Income Rank
* 
 
In this paper we report on the trade-offs that 1,068 Australian university students make 
between absolute income and the rank of that income in hypothetical income distributions. 
We find that income rank matters independently of absolute income, with greater weight 
given to rank by males, migrants, and individuals from wealthy families. Rank-sensitive 
individuals require as much as a 200 per cent increase in income to be compensated for 
going from the top to the bottom of the income distribution. In terms of reference groups, we 
find migrants who reside abroad for longer periods of time, and with more affluent job titles, 
are more likely to compare themselves to others at the destination. This allows us to derive a 
dynamic choice model of compensating incomes that allows for endogenous tastes and rates 
of assimilation. The model predicts the average respondent to need a permanent increase in 
income of up to $10,000 when moving from a society with a mean income of $14,000 (e.g. 
Mexico) to a society with a mean income of $46,000 (e.g. the USA). 
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Status-seeking behaviour is observed in many settings. Whether it be within the family home, school
classroom, workplace, local neighbourhood, the discotheque or prison ground, individuals continually
compare themselves to others. Economists have formally captured this idea via the concept of relative
utility.1 Perhaps, the most prominent example of relative utility at play is Richard Easterlin's seminal
article (1974) which rationalised the lack of an empirical relation between aggregate happiness and ag-
gregate income by appealing to the notion that people's utility depends on relative income rather than
the level of income. This nding has attracted renewed interest in the link between economic choices and
social status. Active researchers have proposed status concerns to be able to explain several economic
phenomena, including the equity-premium puzzle (Constantinides 1990, Gali 1994); stable labour supply
in the face of rising incomes (Neumark and Postlewaite 1998); upward rather than downward sloping
wage proles (Frank and Hutchens 1993, Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991); the feeling of poverty (Sen
1983); the demand for risky activities (Becker et al. 2005); and even migration choices (Stark and Taylor
1991), where someone who is the `king of a small hill' is unlikely to want to move to the `foot of a big
hill'.2 The notion that utility is a function of status, or relative income, entails important consequences
for policy design. At the extreme, economic growth becomes no longer important and the progressive
taxation of status-seeking is the policymaker's primary obsession (Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, Frank
1985, Layard 1980, 2005).
In the present paper, we consider three questions of empirical nature: First, what is the trade-o
between income rank and absolute income in stated-preference choice situations? Second, how long
does it take for individuals migrating between societies to begin comparing themselves to the income
distribution at the destination, and what does this imply for the trade-o above? Finally, does rank
explain choices better than other prominent measures of relative income? We look at these questions
with a sample of 1,068 university students from Australia. Our focus on income rank is partially motivated
by recent work that nds income rank to be a variable of importance for work eort (Clark et al. 2008b),
job satisfaction (Brown et al. 2008), and neighbourhood choice (Clark et al. 2009).3
The advantage of using hypothetical choice situations is that it allows one to isolate all non-income
factors from the choice situation. Solnick and Hemenway (1998), Johanssson-Stenman et al. (2002),
Alpizar et al. (2005), Andersson (2008), and Carlsson et al. (2007, 2009) utilise this idea, and present
respondents with imaginary societies which dier in both the absolute and relative income (consumption)
domains.4 Their results indicate that individuals are willing to exchange absolute income for higher
1 See, for example, Friedman and Savage (1948), Duesenberry (1949), Pollak (1976), Kapteyn (1977), Frank (1985),
Robson (1992), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), and Becker et al. (2005).
2 For a recent survey of the literature on relative utility, see Clark et al. (2008a).
3 The importance of rank order for human behaviour has long been recognised by biologists and social scientists, see e.g.
Parducci (1963), Layard (1980), Frank (1985), Mayer (1997), Postlewaite (1998), and the references therein.
4 An excellent review of earlier studies is Solnick and Hemenway (1998).
1relative income, with the two measures being of similar importance. Choice experiments from these
studies share four common features; (i) participants are university students, (ii) the survey design is of
written format, (iii) relative income is given in the form of own income divided by the average income in
the reference group, and (iv) an entire society forms a reference group. Solnick and Hemenway (1998),
Andersson (2008), and Carlsson et al. (2007) are exceptions to (i). In the two former studies, university
sta members form a part of the sample, providing greater socioeconomic variation. Carlsson et al.
(2007) manage to successfully capture a random sample of the general population by mailing out their
questionnaire to residents of Sweden. A departure from features (ii) and (iv) is realised in Carlsson et al.
(2009). The study introduces a hypothetical setup of the caste system in India, where a more compact
reference group is formed by including a measure of relative standing within one's own cast, in addition
to one's society. The authors also employ a graphical (bar chart) representation of the choice situations,
deviating somewhat from feature (ii).
We contribute to this literature by strictly deviating from features (ii) and (iii). We introduce a survey
instrument of pure graphical construct, where hypothetical societies are described by discrete distributions
of income. Similar to earlier studies, we alter the combination of income and status available in each
society, and ask respondents to state their preferences. Our approach brings about several advantages.
For participants, the task at hand becomes clear as each choice situation is simple to understand and
relate to. At the same time, a graphical construct facilitates the simultaneous inclusion of various forms
of relative income in addition to the widely used ratio comparison income (feature (iii)). This means our
study does not frame the choice situation in terms of absolute level versus rank, but rather allows the
respondent to decide what is important about the choice situation.
Our data allow us to estimate a rich preference specication and contains unique information on
migrant reference groups. We consider the reference group, i.e. the income distribution an individual
relates to, as being endogenous and obtain explicit measures of the amount of time migrants require to
substitute the income distribution in the home society for the one at the destination. We incorporate
this information into a dynamic choice problem, and estimate the compensating income needed to oset
a migrant's loss of status. Overall, in addition to providing new insights into the three questions posed,
our study makes data and methodological contributions to the literature on relative preferences.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical background. Section
3 describes the choice experiment. Section 4 follows with the descriptive results. Section 5 contains the
econometric analysis, where we estimate preference parameters for income rank and absolute income;
study migrant reference groups; and calculate compensating incomes for loss of status. Section 6 focuses
on the most predictive form of relative income. The nal section summarises the ndings and concludes.
22 Theoretical Background
Following Frank (1985), Robson (1992), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), and Becker et al. (2005), we
dene an individual's status (or relative income) by her rank in the distribution of income. This income
rank is usually captured by R(Yi) 2 [0;1], where R(Y ) denotes a cumulative density function of income.
We consider a utility function of the form:
Ui = U hYi;R(Yi)i = Yi + biRi (1)
where Yi is individual i0s absolute level of income, and Ri represents the ordinal rank of income Yi.
Our main interest is in estimating the utility weight 0  bi  1. In the case of bi = 0, we revert to
the neoclassical assumption where utility depends solely upon absolute income. On the other hand, bi
= 1, corresponds to the case where utility is purely a relative concept (dependent on rank order). In
the empirical application, bi will be a function of individual characteristics, and the income distribution
against which an individual calculates her rank Ri will also be endogenous.
In addition to the arguments in utility function (1), we consider other popular measures of relative
income, namely: (i) ratio comparison income, Yi=Y , where individuals are assumed to compare themselves
to the average in society, Y , and (ii) the notion of relative deprivation, dened as the proportion of
individuals in i0s reference group who are richer than i, weighted by their mean excess income (Yitzhaki
1979). We dene these measures more formally in Section 6.
3 The Choice Experiment
Employing a graphical stated preference approach, we present respondents with 11 hypothetical choice
situations. In each choice situation, respondents are asked to make a choice between two hypothetical
countries/societies, A and B. Each society is characterised by an income distribution, made up of 9
hypothetical income earners. These individuals form a reference group. Of the nine individuals, one is
pre-selected (highlighted) to represent the imagined respondent. This approach deviates somewhat from
existing studies where respondents are made to represent a future relative, such as a grandchild. The
idea in those studies being to isolate choice making from any pending life shocks. Although intuitive,
it can nevertheless be argued that such a representation draws the decision maker further away from
reality. This comes about as survey respondents are made to consider a `two-dimensional' hypothetical;
(i) making hypothetical choices, and (ii) doing so, on behalf of someone who is yet to, or never may, exist.
Furthermore, as respondents have quite limited information about the preferences of their imaginary
grandchild, they are bound to express their own. To this end, allowing respondents to represent themselves
bears no serious limitation, i.e. gains realism.
The hypothetical societies are described by a set of attributes, namely income and positional measures.
3These attributes are varied across choice situations to provide the variation needed to estimate preference
parameters. The amount of income each member of society enjoys is made explicit. On the other hand,
positional measures, such as income rank, are not. These values are easily inferred upon visual inspection
of each choice situation.
The survey consists of two parts. Part A asks respondents a set of socioeconomic questions. A subset
of these examines actual reference groups. Part B of the survey contains the 11 choice situations. At
the beginning of each session, participants are given verbal information and instructions about the study.
Detailed information about the research question(s) is withheld until all responses are complete. By not
promoting the general research question (`Does relative standing matter?'), we avoid placing any pressure
on participants to make the study a success (or a failure). We simply allow participants to realise the
concept independently.
Before recording their preferences, survey respondents read the following instructions:
The following 11 questions ask you to select ONE from two possible options. Based on your
preferences, please indicate (by circling either the illustrated individual marked + in Country
A, or the individual marked in Country B) in which `Country' you would prefer to be in,
excluding all other factors.
The annual after-tax income/salary of each individual (measured in Australian dollars) is
displayed directly below the illustrated individual. In the two countries, the cost of living is
identical.
We next illustrate the constructed choice situations. In choice situations 1 to 6, we study choices
between absolute income and income rank. Choice situations 7, 8 and 9, evaluate choices between
alternative forms of relative income. There, we examine whether individuals maximise income rank or
ratio comparison income. Similarly, the last two choice situations (10 and 11) focus on the trade-o
between income rank and relative deprivation.
3.1 Choice Situations 1 to 6
In choice situation 1 (Figure 1), the respondent is asked to select between the highlighted income earner
in society A (top panel) and the highlighted income earner in society B (bottom panel). Income levels
in society A are discretely distributed between $10,000 and $90,000. The imagined respondent earns an
income of $70,000 in society A, and is ranked 3rd from the top. In society B, the highest income earner
attains $40,000 and an income rank of 1. This corresponds to the imagined respondent. The lowest
income level in society B is $500. Overall, the respondent faces a choice between a higher absolute level
of income (society A) or a higher ordinal rank of income (society B). Are individuals willing to forgo
$30,000 for `top-dog' status?
4Fig. 1: Choice Situation 1 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
In choice situation 2 (Figure 2), we focus on the lower end of the income distribution. The choice of
society A results in own income of $10,000 and an income rank of 9, i.e. last place. On the other hand, the
choice of society B entails higher status (income rank of 7), however a lower level of income ($2,500). By
choosing society B, individuals forgo $7,500 and climb 2 ranks up from the bottom of society. Similarly,
in choice situation 3, we focus on the middle part of the income distribution (see Appendix A1).
Fig. 2: Choice Situation 2 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
In choice situations 4, 5, and 6, the income gap between the two hypothetical societies is reduced.
The income distribution in society A is left unchanged, while that of society B is shifted to the right
(Figure 3). The dierence between the top incomes is now $15,000. Here, the choice is analogous to one
faced by a resident of a rich society (A) who is contemplating a move to a slightly less richer society (B).
In choice situation 4, a move from society A to B brings about a fall in absolute income of $5,000 and a
gain in status of one income rank (resulting in `top-dog' status). Choice situations 5 and 6 allow for the
same trade-o, however only for dierent parts of the income distribution (see Appendix A1).
5Fig. 3: Choice Situation 4 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
It should be noted that choice situations 1 to 6 are subject to some criticism. Since we present entire
distributions of income, survey respondents could potentially be maximising a range of relative income
measures, or even measures of inequality. This comes about as none of the relative income measures
are held constant across societies. Table 2 contains the actual values of these variables. For instance, in
choice situations 1, 4 and 6, society A presents a higher level of absolute income, while society B oers a
bundle of more favourable positional measures (i.e. income rank, ratio comparison income, and relative
deprivation). Which of the latter three measures is being maximised? To determine this, we set up an
econometric `beauty contest' between the dierent attributes of these distributions (see Section 6).
3.2 Choice Situations 7, 8 and 9
Choice situations 7, 8 and 9 examine choices between income rank and ratio comparison income. Here,
the latter measure, along with absolute income, is held constant across the two imaginary societies, while
income rank is varied. The intuition is as follows: if income rank is of no importance, conditional on both
absolute income and ratio comparison income, we should realise a uniform choice distribution. That is, in
a large sample, we would expect an approximate fty percent chance of either society being selected (i.e.
a lottery). Any signicant deviation, in favour of the higher rank option, would support rank maximising
behaviour (conditional on the other income measures). Figure 4 illustrates choice situation 7. An income
rank of 3 is obtained in society A, and a rank of 2 (second best) in society B. Representations of choice
situations 8 and 9, where we study the bottom and middle parts of the income distribution, are contained
in Appendix A1.
6Fig. 4: Choice Situation 7 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
3.3 Choice Situations 10 and 11
In the last two choice situations (cs 10 and 11), we study preferences for income rank and relative
deprivation. To obtain a clear result, we keep absolute income and ratio comparison income constant,
and oer respondents a more favourable level of only one attribute in each society. In choice situation
10, society A oers a lower (higher) level of relative deprivation (satisfaction) and a lower income rank,
relative to society B. Hence, a `rank maximiser' would prefer society B, while a `rd minimiser' would
favour society A. In choice situation 11, the same trade-o is in place for individuals residing at the
bottom end of the income distribution (see Appendix A1).
Fig. 5: Choice Situation 10 (Income Rank vs. Relative Deprivation)
In the version of the survey presented above, society B (the bottom panel) may be labelled as `status-
seeker paradise', oering a higher level of status in each choice situation. To minimise potential ordering
or systematic choice eects, a second version of the survey was distributed to roughly half (455) of
7the participants. This was a randomised copy of the one presented above (see Appendix A2), where
we altered the order of choice situations and randomly assigned the `country/society' with the more
favourable income rank (to the top (A) and bottom (B) panels).
4 Descriptive Results
Our sample consists of 1;068 students from the Faculty of Business at the Queensland University of
Technology in Brisbane, Australia. The respondents, being university students, were on average young,
single, low-income earners from wealthy families (see Table 1). About one-third (315) of the respondents
had migrated to Australia from another country. Studying migrants is of interest to us since these
individuals may have already experienced, or are likely to experience, similar choice situations in real-
life. We split the sample into two groups, migrants and non-migrants, and nd that respondents from
the former are on average more educated, earn higher incomes, and come from less wealthier families.5
In addition, we capture interesting information about reference groups. Two-thirds of the migrants
compared themselves, in terms of income level, to family members, friends and colleagues from the
destination country (Australia), giving support to reference group substitution.
Table 2 presents response frequencies for each choice situation.6 In general, individuals do care about
income rank. Of the 11,748 total choices made, 44 percent (5,169) correspond to the society oering a
higher income rank. This result is consistent with earlier studies, such as Solnick and Hemenway (1998),
where about 50 percent of the respondents selected the society with a more favourable relative income.
Responses for the rst three choice situations suggest that individuals are willing to pay a non-trivial
premium for a higher income rank. As expected, being in last place seems to derive the most disutility
with 42 percent of the respondents avoiding society A in choice situation 2. The proportion of status-
seekers broadly increases when we reduce the price of status (cs 4, 5 and 6). Income rank seems to
outperform ratio comparison income (rci) as a measure of status. This is apparent in choice situations 7
and 9, where 60 per cent of respondents selected the society with a higher income rank. The opposite is
true in choice situation 8, where rci maximising behaviour is evident. In the case of income rank versus
relative deprivation (cs 10 and 11), the former measure seems to matter most for low-income individuals
(cs 11).
5 See Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A3.
6 We nd no signicant dierences (at the :05 level) between sample proportions for the choice situations across the
two versions of the survey, suggesting the absence of any ordering or systematic choice eects. Hence, we proceed by
combining/pooling responses from the two surveys.
8Table 1: Variable definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std
Age Years of age 22.48 5.91
Gender = 1 if male 0.46 0.50
Partner = 1 if have partner 0.29 0.45
Yrs of education 12.66 1.07
= 12 if completed high school
13 if graduate certicate/diploma
15 if university degree
Employed = 1 if employed 0.70 0.46
Job title 1.12 1.00
= 1 if low skilled (e.g. cashier)
2 if junior/associate professional (e.g. graduate engineer)
3 if professional (e.g. senior engineer)
Income Disposable annual income from all sources ('000 AUD) 32.10 23.38
Family wealth Perceived family wealth relative to average Australian family 3.35 0.87
= 1 if much poorer
2 if somewhat poor
3 if as rich
4 if slightly richer
5 if much richer
Migrant = 1 if migrated to Australia 0.29 0.46
Yrs in Australia (A) Number of years since arrival to Australia 5.61 5.44
In contact Home (H) = 1 if in contact with friends/work colleagues from Home 0.89 0.32
Friends in Australia = 1 if formed new friends/work colleagues in Australia 0.97 0.16
Contact, A vs H = 1 if more in contact with colleagues in Australia 0.71 0.45
Reference group, A vs H = 1 if reference group in Australia 0.66 0.47
9Table 2: Attributes of societies and Response frequencies
CS Society Abs Income Income Rank Avg Inc Society Std Dev Inc Ratio Comp Income Rel Dep Poverty b p(Society)
1 A (70,000) 3 (50,000) 27,386 1.40 3,333 (0.22) 0.78
B 40,000 (1) 12,944 (14,057) (3.09) (0) 0.44 0.22
2 A (10,000) 9 (50,000) 27,386 (0.20) 40,000 (0.22) 0.58
B 2,500 (7) 12,944 (14,057) 0.19 (10,830) 0.44 0.42
3 A (40,000) 6 (50,000) 27,386 (0.80) 16,666 (0.22) 0.74
B 10,000 (4) 12,944 (14,057) 0.77 (6,666) 0.44 0.26
4 A (80,000) 2 (50,000) 27,386 1.60 1,111 (0.22) 0.61
B 75,000 (1) 35,667 (26,344) (2.10) (0) 0.33 0.39
5 A (10,000) 9 (50,000) 27,386 (0.20) 40,000 (0.22) 0.62
B 5,000 (8) 35,667 (26,344) 0.14 (31,111) 0.33 0.38
6 A (50,000) 5 (50,000) 27,386 1.00 11,111 (0.22) 0.64
B 45,000 (4) 35,667 (26,344) (1.26) (6,666) 0.33 0.36
7 A 80,000 3 58,222 24,869 1.37 1,550 0.11 0.39
B 80,000 (2) 58,222 (24,621) 1.37 (1,111) 0.11 0.61
8 A 30,000 8 52,667 23,958 0.57 23,777 0.11 0.51
B 30,000 (7) 52,667 (23,701) 0.57 (23,333) (0.00) 0.49
9 A 60,000 5 56,000 23,108 1.07 7,111 0.11 0.38
B 60,000 (4) 56,000 (22,842) 1.07 (6,666) 0.11 0.62
10 A 80,000 3 58,333 (25,000) 1.37 (1,666) 0.11 0.51
B 80,000 (2) 58,333 25,739 1.37 2,222 0.11 0.49
11 A 30,000 8 52,778 (23,863) 0.57 (23,777) (0.11) 0.39
B 30,000 (7) 52,778 27,055 0.57 24,444 0.22 0.61
Note: Income Rank is dened as the ordinal rank of own income out of 9, where 1 = highest (best) and 9 = lowest (worst). Ratio Comp Income is calculated by dividing column
(3) by column (5). Std Dev Inc is the standard deviation of income in society. Rel Dep is the proportion of individuals who are richer than the imagined respondent, weighted by
their mean excess income. Poverty is the proportion of individuals below half of the mean-income in society. Parentheses indicate the society with the more favourable measure.




In estimating utility function (1), we consider a random utility model of the form
Us
it = V (As
t;Xi) + s
it = aY s
t + bRs
t + cXi + s
it (2)
where Us
it is the utility individual i derives from society s = A;B in choice situation t = 1;2;:::11. The
observed portion of utility, V s
it, is assumed to be a linear-in-parameters function of the vector of choice
attributes, As
t = hY s
t ;Rs
ti, and a vector of individual characteristics, Xi. The unobserved portion of
utility, s
it, is included to capture any outside concepts that are brought into the choice experiment by the
respondent. These include, for example, inattention by the respondent to the task, pure randomness in
the respondent's choices, or other quixotic aspects of the stated-preference choices (see Train 2003, Train
and Wilson 2008). Furthermore, preferences for absolute income and income rank are bound to dier
across socioeconomic groups. To account for this heterogeneity, we specify the preference parameters, a
and b, as linear functions of the elements of Xi. For example, b = k + dMalei + gMigranti + hWealthi,
where d, g, and h are the interaction eects of interest.
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We estimate a and b using a repeated binary probit model, where e it  N(0;1).7 Table 3 reports the
maximum likelihood results for dierent model specications.8 The taste parameter estimates reect beta
coecients as the choice attributes, absolute income and income rank, are in standardised form. Similarly,
socioeconomic characteristics such as age, years of education, income and family wealth level have been
rescaled into z-scores, allowing us to make inferences about the relative magnitude of preferences.9
Income rank does matter for choice behaviour, however to a smaller degree than absolute income.
Consider rst the estimates from model (2). There, a rank-sensitive individual (male, migrant, from a
wealthy family) values absolute income twice as much as income rank (a = 0:9, b = 0:46). On the other
hand, for the reference individual (female, non-migrant, of average wealth) income rank plays no part in
7 To simplify interpretation of the results, we redene Income Rank as `10 - ordinal income rank' (from Table 2). That
is, from here on, the top ranked individual (ordinal rank of 1) has an income rank of 9, and the bottom ranked individual
attains an income rank of 1.
8 A log-linear utility specication was also estimated. However, the t of the model, based on the value of the likelihood
function, was signicantly lower. Hence, we do not report the results.
9 As we are only interested in the relative magnitude and direction of the preference parameters (a and b) in the random
utility model, i.e. the marginal utility of choice attributes, we only report the (raw) coecient estimates (in Table 3),
and not the marginal eects. For a recent discussion on dierent approaches to analysing interaction eects of variables in
non-linear models; see, for example, Ai and Norton (2004) and Greene (2010).
11Table 3: Preference Parameter Estimates for Absolute Income and Income Rank
Model Specication: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Attribute Coecient Est Coecient Est Coecient Est Coecient Est
Abs Income 0.8113 (0.000) 0.7981 (0.000) 0.7341 (0.000) 0.7064 (0.000)
Income Rank 0.1254 (0.000) -0.0019 (0.971) 0.0277 (0.719) 0.0138 (0.861)
Interaction Term
Age  Abs Income -0.0506 (0.284) -0.0069 (0.898)
Age  Income Rank 0.0283 (0.502) 0.0549 (0.253)
Male  Abs Income 0.0485 (0.546) 0.0593 (0.464) 0.0673 (0.407)
Male  Income Rank 0.1580 (0.026) 0.1513 (0.034) 0.1551 (0.030)
Partner  Abs Income 0.1316 (0.194) 0.1496 (0.143)
Partner  Income Rank -0.1371 (0.119) -0.1292 (0.144)
Educ  Abs Income -0.0784 (0.100)
Educ  Income Rank -0.0743 (0.079)
Job Title  Abs Income 0.0179 (0.690) 0.0244 (0.594)
Job Title  Income Rank 0.0125 (0.752) 0.0126 (0.754)
Income  Abs Income -0.0264 (0.583)
Income  Income Rank 0.0122 (0.775)
Family Wealth  Abs Income 0.0700 (0.082) 0.0659 (0.104) 0.0649 (0.111)
Family Wealth  Income Rank 0.1153 (0.001) 0.1175 (0.001) 0.1140 (0.002)
Migrant  Abs Income -0.0216 (0.806) -0.0043 (0.963) 0.0375 (0.692)
Migrant  Income Rank 0.1864 (0.017) 0.1855 (0.023) 0.2192 (0.009)
Number of observations: 11,748 11,748 11,748 11,748
Log-likelihood: -7757.4 -7740.5 -7732.0 -7729.5
Note: Abs Income, Income Rank, Age, Educ, Income and Family Wealth are in standardised form. Model is estimated
using responses for choice situations 1 to 12. P-values in parentheses.
determining choices, and absolute income is of sole importance (a = 0:8, b = 0). The latter individual
(and tastes) also characterises the average female respondent from our sample.
In a more general specication, such as model (3), the relative taste parameter ratios (a=b) are: 1:15
for a young rank-sensitive individual, and 18:08 for the average female respondent, where the former
agent has similar preferences for income and status, and the latter is purely interested in her material
welfare.10
Estimates of the interaction eects suggest that income rank becomes more important as family wealth
rises. This is consistent with Veblen's (1899) theory of conspicuous consumption and leisure, where he
describes the rich as primarily engaging in activities that display their status, such as via the purchase of
luxurious homes or spending time on activities that have no productive purpose, as opposed to the less
rich individuals who have to spend more time on productive activities.11
The coecient for the interaction between males and income rank is positive and signicant meaning
10 Individual types, their characteristics and preferences are summarised in Table 10 in Appendix A3.
11 In contrast, a recent study using the European Social Survey (Clark and Senik 2010) nds income comparisons being
more prevalent amongst the poor.
12that the males in our sample care more about rank than females. This nding ts the arguments of
Frank (1999) who explains the tendency in males to seek status as possibly having evolved from the once
popular practise of polygamous marriage arrangements, where the highest ranked male had the greatest
number of o-spring. However, our nding contradicts that by Johanssson-Stenman et al. (2002) and
Alpizar et al. (2005), who surprisingly nd females to be more status oriented in choice situations where
the respondent has to choose between bundles of numeric absolute and relative incomes. Nonetheless,
the result is supported by Carlsson et al. (2009).
A signicant dierence in tastes for rank order is also apparent between migrant and non-migrant
groups suggesting that those who migrate do so partially in order to increase their social status. This
contrasts with neoclassical models of labour migration, where absolute income dierentials are the main
determinants of migration streams. From these models, one would expect that, for example, Mexican
migrants move to the USA only for the higher absolute wealth and ignore any relative income eects.
However, Stark and Taylor (1991), amongst others, nd the top income earners within a neighbourhood,
village or country to have a lower propensity to migrate. This makes sense within our ndings as rank-
maximising behaviour implies that those individuals at the top in the sending distribution have more
rank to lose than those at the bottom.
Given the dierences between survey instruments and empirical methodologies, we are unable to
directly compare our results to those in earlier studies. In general, however, students in Australia seem
to care about relative standing to a similar degree as students, or respondents, in the USA (Solnick and
Hemenway 1998) and Sweden (Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Carlsson et al. 2007). Furthermore, the
apparent importance of income rank for choice behaviour is consistent with the ndings in Brown et al.
(2008) and Clark et al. (2009), where the authors nd a positive and signicant eect of a higher income
rank on economic satisfaction.
5.2 Compensating Income for Loss of Status: The Static Model
In this section we estimate the income required to compensate an individual who experiences a loss
of status. We develop a static choice problem where an individual moving between two societies, or
neighbourhoods, fails to experience a fall in her utility level, when the two societies are characterised by
dierent income distributions. That is, we estimate the amount of income that an individual needs to
receive after moving from a poor to a rich society, where in the latter her income rank is reduced. We
have the following static problem:
U hYh;Rh(Yh)i = U hYd;Rd(Yh)i (4)
where the subscripts h and d denote the society at home and the destination respectively; Rh(Yh) is the
ordinal rank of income level Yh in the income distribution at home; and Rd(Yh) is the ordinal rank of
13Yh in the income distribution at the destination, where by construct Rh(Yh) > Rd(Yh). We assume the
individual to assimilate, and compare to others, at the destination instantaneously. As this is a quite
strong behavioural assumption, we later study the case where migrants take some time to substitute
reference groups, and hence do not experience the entire fall in status upon arrival. It should be noted
that heterogeneity enters the model via: (i) preferences for income and rank, from probit model (3)
reported in Table 3, and (ii) initial incomes and positions within the home distribution.
We continue the above example of migratory behaviour between Mexico (home, poor) and the
USA (destination, rich), and describe incomes in each society using a lognormal distribution, denoted
LN(;2). Formally, a lognormal variable y has
E[y] = e+
2=2 (5)













where  is the cumulative normal density function (see Aitchison and Brown 1957). Consequently, the











 = ln(E [y])   2=2 (9)
We obtain the parameters  and  of the lognormal income distribution in each country by substituting
recorded values of output per capita, E[y], and the Gini coecient, G, into (8) and (9) above. Real
GDP per capita in Mexico and the USA is $14;400 and $46;600 respectively, and the corresponding Gini
coecent values are 0:47 and 0:38 (OECD.Stat 2010). Thus, we model incomes at home (Mexico) and
the destination (USA) as Yh  LN(9:18;0:79) and Yd  LN(10:5;0:49).
Figure 6 presents the solution to the static choice problem for four dierent individuals. The general
estimates suggest that individuals residing in the bottom and middle parts of the home income distribution
are required to be compensated quite a bit more than the elites, in order to be equally well-o in both
societies. This results from the former group enduring a greater loss of status at the destination. The
reference individual requires the least amount of monetary compensation due to the low utility importance
assigned to status. As expected, rank-sensitive individuals require the highest compensatory income given
their strong preferences for rank. A young rank-sensitive individual, earning an annual income of $14;000
in Mexico, requires a permanent increase in income of $30;000 in the USA. Similarly, the average male
respondent requires an approximate permanent increase in income of $20;000.
































































Fig. 6: Compensating Income for Loss of Status (Static Model)
5.3 Migrant Reference Groups
A novel part of the data set collected is the information on migrant reference groups. Migrants were
explicitly asked whether they compared themselves, in terms of income level, to others in their home
country or in the country they currently reside:
In terms of personal achievement (such as Income), which of the two groups, would you say,
you compare yourself to? (a) From Australia (b) From Home Country.
Two-thirds of migrant respondents compared themselves to family members, friends, and colleagues in
the latter society, indicating the presence of reference group substitution. A key determinant of this
reference group substitution is the length of time away from home. We observe the mean value of this
variable to be 5.6 years, with 12 percent of the migrants having arrived in Australia less than 1 year ago;
50 percent between 1 and 5 years; 22 percent between 6 and 10 years; 14 percent between 11 and 20
years; and 2 percent arrived more than 20 years ago.
To nd out more, we analyse the eects of `time away from home', and other migrant characteristics,
on the probability of reference group substitution. The binary response variable, yi, is set to 1 if individual
i compares to others in the society abroad (i.e. Australia), and yi = 0 if the individual relates to others
in the home society. Here, we interpret yi = 1 as migrant reference group substitution or, in other words,
complete assimilation.
Table 4 presents the binary logit coecient estimates. `Time away from home' seems to be an impor-
tant determinant of reference group substitution. The positive coecient suggests that the more time
migrants spend away from home, the more likely they are to form peer groups at the destination. Gender,
15relationship status, and family wealth play no part in determining reference groups. The age characteristic
is statistically insignicant at the 10 percent level, nevertheless the corresponding coecient intuitively
suggests that young migrants adapt better to new cultures and surroundings relative to the elder. Not
surprisingly, migrants with more prominent job titles alter their reference groups more frequently. These
individuals are employed as white-collar managers, supervisors and senior professionals, taking on high
levels of responsibility and interest in their workplace. One feature of such positions is the presence of
large social networks, making it less dicult to form new friends and work colleagues. Moreover, these
individuals may be choosing reference groups based on their comparative advantage in obtaining high
status (see Frank 1985).






Family wealth -0.140 (0.403)
Job title 0.574 (0.005)
Time away from home (yrs) 0.227 (0.000)
Number of observations: 249
Log-likelihood: -126.4
Note: Dependent variable equals 1 if individual compares to
others at destination, and 0 otherwise. P-values in parentheses.
Figure 7 shows the degree of assimilation for dierent migrant types, who are of similar characteristics
as the individuals studied in the static problem above (Section 5.2). Migrants seem to require a period of
approximately 25 years to completely assimilate at the destination. The eect that a higher job title (or
education level) and age have on the initial propensity to assimilate is evident: Rank-sensitive individual
(i)'s superior job title translates into a 0.15 higher initial probability of assimilation relative to the average
respondent. The same individual type has a 0.25 probability advantage over rank-sensitive individual
(ii), where the latter agent is 17 years older than the former.













































Fig. 7: Degree of Migrant Assimilation over Time
5.3.1 Compensating Income for Loss of Status with Endogenous Assimilation
We use the above assimilation model to derive the dynamic form of compensating incomes for migrants
who, by construct, endure a loss of status at the destination. The notion that reference group substitution
takes time is included in the model by allowing the importance of a lower income rank abroad (in period
t) to be determined by the degree of assimilation (in period t). Thereby, low status is not realised
immediately upon arrival. Instead, its importance gradually increases with the length of time away from
home. The degree of assimilation, after t periods, is estimated using the logit probability model from
Table 4. We do so for dierent migrant types, while keeping in mind that the `time away from home'
and `age' characteristics increase with t. We have the following programming problem:
Ti X
t=1
e t [Uit hYh;Rh(Yh)i] =
Ti X
t=1
e t [Uit hYd;Rd(Yd)iit + Uit hYd;Rh(Yd)i(1   it)] (10)
where Ti t is the number of years that individual i still has to live,  is the discount rate for future years,
and 0  it  1 is the degree to which i has assimilated into the society at the destination. Individual i0s
status consists of two parts: (i) rank at the destination Rd(Yd), and (ii) rank of the destination income
back home Rh(Yd). The relative weight assigned to each component of status changes in each time period
as the individual gradually assimilates at the destination and changes reference groups, i.e. it ! 1.
The idea behind this approach is to ask an individual who is contemplating to migrate in period 1,
and is fully aware of the dynamic changes in the utility function, how high her income would have to
be (until death) for her to have the same discounted utility abroad as in the situation with no possible
migration. To determine this amount, we return to the previously dened income distributions of Mexico
(home, poor) and the USA (destination, rich), and search ordered pairs of incomes (Yd;Yh) for which
equality (10) holds. This dynamic choice model includes three types of heterogeneity: (i) preferences
17for income and status, (ii) degree of assimilation over time, and (iii) initial incomes and positions in the
home income distribution. We set Ti = 65 Agei, i.e., the migrant is assumed to endure the given loss of
status until the age of 65 (end of a working life). The calculations are done for an annual discount rate
 of 5 per cent.
Figure 8 presents the solution to (10) for dierent migrant types. As in the static case, migrants who
occupy the bottom-half of the income distribution in the poor society require the highest monetary com-
pensation at the destination. The permanent increase in income required for a rank-sensitive individual,
who is not amongst the elite, is approximately $15;000. For elite migrants, the compensatory income
is approximately half of the latter amount ($7;500) due to these individuals not experiencing as much
of a fall in income rank. Even though the average female respondent assimilates into the richer society
at a relatively high rate, the low utility weight attached to status results in her demanding a low level
of monetary compensation. On the other hand, a male average respondent, who considers status to be
important, requires a permanent increase in income of approximately $10;000.
































































Fig. 8: Compensating Income for Loss of Status with Endogenous Assimilation
186 A `Relative' Beauty Contest
What form of relative income do individuals maximise? Do individuals really care about some form of
relative income, or about entirely dierent aspects of the hypothesised income distributions, such as the
degree of inequality or the poverty rate? These are important, however very much neglected, questions
within the relative utility literature. The importance of the issue arises from the proposition that choice
behaviour and social welfare are set to dier under the alternative measures of relative income; see, for
example, Layard (1980, 2005), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Stark and Wang (2005), and Bilancini and
Boncinelli (2008).
In many studies, relative income is expressed as ratio comparison income, Yi=Y , where individuals are
assumed to compare themselves to the average in society, Y . There, status and utility are determined by
how much higher or lower Yi is relative to Y . Another popular measure of relative income is drawn from
sociology. Runciman (1966) assumes that people compare themselves with others, and feel relatively
deprived when others have what they desire. This form of social comparison has been included in
economic models of income inequality (Yitzhaki 1979) and labour migration (Stark and Taylor 1991). In
these studies, relative deprivation is dened as the proportion of individuals in i0s reference group who
are richer than i, weighted by their mean excess income:
RDi = (1   R(Yi))E (Y i   Yi j Y i > Yi) (11)
where R(Y ) 2 [0;1] denotes a cumulative density function of income.
We ascertain which of the above measures accounts for the data better by predicting the observed
choices using dierent combinations of income measures and then comparing the resulting log-likelihood
values.12 In addition to the absolute and relative income measures discussed so far, we include two
measures of income inequality: (i) standard deviation of income in society, and (ii) a poverty measure,
dened as the proportion of individuals below half of the mean-income in society.
Table 5 reports the values of log-likelihood functions from the estimated binary probit models. The
highest log-likelihood is realised in Model 1, where absolute income and income rank are the two choice
attributes. A near identical log-likelihood value is obtained by estimating Model 2, where the more
popular relative income measure, ratio comparison income, is used. The two measures of income inequality
perform relatively well in explaining choices, occupying positions 4 and 5. Overall, we can conclude that
rank is the best tting measure of relative income, however the dierence in predictive ability between
12 An alternative would be to try and estimate a structural model with all the income concepts included at the same time.
This approach gives rise to collinearity issues as each relative income measures is a function on income. For example, 98 per
cent of the variation in absolute income in our data is explained by the variation in income rank, relative deprivation, and
average income in society, making estimates of models with many income constructs nonsensical. This issue is, unfortunately,
almost unavoidable. In order to get more independent variation between the dierent income concepts, one would have to
resort to using unrealistic distributions (such as a binary distribution) in which case the question arises whether respondents
would be able to envisage what such a society would be like. We hence face a trade-o between realism and the ability
(ex-post) to separately identify the contribution of each income concept.
19rank and ratio comparison income is trivial.

















Std Dev of Income -7840.23
9 Income Rank
Poverty Measure -7872.33
10 Ratio Comp Income
Rel Deprivation -7837.97
11 Ratio Comp Income
Std Dev of Income -7794.71
12 Ratio Comp Income
Poverty Measure -7819.75
13 Rel Deprivation
Std Dev of Income -7820.14
14 Rel Deprivation
Poverty Measure -7867.78
15 Std Dev of Income
Poverty Measure -7825.41
Number of observations: 11,748
Note: Each binary probit model was estimated using responses for choice situations 1 to 12.
207 Conclusion
This paper used a novel survey instrument to study the choice behaviour of Australian university students
over the respondent's ranking in a hypothetical income distribution. The main interests concerned: (i) the
utility importance of income rank relative to absolute income, (ii) the endogeneity of migrant reference
groups, and (iii) the most predictive form of relative income.
We nd that income rank matters relative to absolute income, where the preference parameter is
estimated to be higher for males, migrants, and individuals from wealthy families.The most rank-sensitive
individuals attach an almost equal weight to rank and absolute income, implying they would require as
much as a 200 per cent increase in income to be compensated for a complete loss of rank (i.e., to move
from the top of a small hill to the foot of a big hill).
In terms of reference groups, we nd migrants who reside abroad for longer periods of time, and with
more auent job titles, are more likely to compare with others at the destination. Using this information,
we introduced a dynamic problem of compensating incomes. Heterogeneity entered this model via; tastes,
assimilation, and initial standing within the home society. We used the model to calculate the amount of
additional income that a fully rational migrant, with reduced status, required in order to enjoy the same
discounted lifetime utility as in the situation where she had not migrated. The average respondent from
a low-income society (e.g., Mexico), where the mean income is $14;000, required a permanent income
increase of 30 per cent (on average) to move to a rich society (e.g., the USA).
Our nal interest involved the form of relative income that explains observed choices best. We ran
an econometric `beauty contest' between various measures of income, status, and inequality. Based on
the value of the likelihood function, income rank accounted for observed choices best, however ratio
comparison income produced an almost identical model t. Both of these relative income measures
predicted choices better than relative deprivation, relative poverty, and income inequality. Thus, we
concluded that individuals seem to be pursuing the more simple measures of status.
The survey instrument introduced in this study has enabled us to examine entire income distribu-
tions, coupled with the notion of endogenous reference group formation. Despite this richness, using
stated-preferences entails some important limitations. Most apparent, what people say they will do is
often not the same as what they actually do. Even if participants do respond as if they applied their
true utility weights to the attributes presented in the choice experiment, the choice scenarios are quite
dierent from a real-life situation in which migration costs will be non-negligible. These shortcomings,
and others, are detailed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), and, more recently, Levitt and List (2007).
Additionally, Carlsson et al. (2009) discuss more specic problems in current approaches to measuring
relative preferences.
Overall, the notion that people's utility is partially determined by how their income measures up to
21that of others in a society seems to be a settling debate. The form of relative income that individuals
relate to is yet to be agreed upon. This issue is important for the policymaker as choice behaviour and
social welfare are set to dier under the alternative measures of relative income. For instance, if we
consider individuals to be sensitive to income rank instead of ratio comparison income, then there always
exists an individual who is placed rst and another individual who is placed last, i.e. the overall amount
of rank is immutable. This linearity implies no direct role for the re-distribution of income (however,
there still may be an indirect role via the eort individuals waste on increasing their rank, see Frank
(1985)). On the other hand, if utility depends, in a concave manner, on ratio comparison and average
(group) income, then overall utility can be increased via transfers from the rich to the poor, strengthening
the case for re-distribution that could be made on the basis of the importance of absolute income for
utility. Similarly, as in Frank (1985), it may be possible to observe several rank races, where multiple
individuals are led to believe that they occupy rst place. Such behaviour is dicult to imagine when
individuals care about their position relative to the average in society.
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26A Appendix
A.1 Choice Situations: Survey version 1
Fig. 9: Choice Situation 3 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
Fig. 10: Choice Situation 5 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
Fig. 11: Choice Situation 6 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
27Fig. 12: Choice Situation 8 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
Fig. 13: Choice Situation 9 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
Fig. 14: Choice Situation 11 (Income Rank vs. Relative Deprivation)
28A.2 Choice Situations: Survey version 2
Fig. 15: Choice Situation 1 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
Fig. 16: Choice Situation 2 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
Fig. 17: Choice Situation 3 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
29Fig. 18: Choice Situation 4 (Income Rank vs. Relative Deprivation)
Fig. 19: Choice Situation 5 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
Fig. 20: Choice Situation 6 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
30Fig. 21: Choice Situation 7 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
Fig. 22: Choice Situation 8 (Income Rank vs. Ratio Comparison Income)
Fig. 23: Choice Situation 9 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
31Fig. 24: Choice Situation 10 (Income Rank vs. Relative Deprivation)
Fig. 25: Choice Situation 11 (Income Rank vs. Absolute Income)
32A.3 Other Summary Statistics and Descriptive Results
Table 6: Summary statistics, full sample
Mean Std Min Max
Age 22.48 5.91 16 55
Gender 0.46 0.50 0 1
Partner 0.29 0.45 0 1
Educated 0.38 0.48 0 1
Yrs of education 12.66 1.07 12 15
Employed 0.70 0.46 0 1
Job title 1.12 1.00 0 3
Income 32.10 23.38 15 100
Family wealth 3.35 0.87 1 5
Migrant 0.29 0.46 0 1
Number of observations: 1,068
Table 7: Summary statistics, Non-migrant subsample
Mean Std Min Max
Age 22.12 6.06 17 55
Gender 0.43 0.50 0 1
Partner 0.29 0.46 0 1
Educated 0.31 0.46 0 1
Yrs of education 12.49 0.92 12 15
Employed 0.79 0.41 0 1
Job title 1.27 0.97 0 3
Income 31.33 23.36 15 100
Family wealth 3.42 0.85 1 5
Number of observations: 753
33Table 8: Summary statistics, Migrant subsample
Mean Std Min Max
Age 23.34 5.45 16 52
Gender 0.52 0.50 0 1
Partner 0.28 0.45 0 1
Educated 0.54 0.50 0 1
Yrs of education 13.08 1.27 12 15
Employed 0.46 0.50 0 1
Job title 0.75 0.99 0 3
Income 33.95 23.36 15 100
Family wealth 3.18 0.90 1 5
Yrs in Australia 5.61 5.44 0 28
In contact Home 0.89 0.32 0 1
Friends in Australia 0.97 0.16 0 1
Contact, A vs H 0.71 0.45 0 1
Reference group, A vs H 0.66 0.47 0 1
Number of observations: 315
Table 9: Correlation Matrix: Choice Attributes
Abs Income Income Rank Avg Inc Society Std Dev Inc Ratio Comp Income Rel Dep Poverty
Abs Income 1
Income Rank 0.79 1
Avg Inc Society 0.50 -0.08 1
Std Dev Inc 0.33 -0.14 0.76 1
Ratio Comp Income 0.65 0.88 -0.15 -0.18 1
Rel Dep -0.76 -0.93 0.11 0.27 -0.77 1
Poverty -0.43 0.11 -0.91 -0.52 0.16 -0.09 1
Note: Correlation coecients between choice attributes for choice situations 1 to 12, where each choice situation consists
of societies A and B. Each attribute vector is of size (221), see Table 2.
34Table 10: Individual Types, Characteristics, & Preferences
Individual type Set of characteristics (Xi) Pref. parameters (a;b)
Reference Individual 22.48, 0, 0, 0, 3.35, 0 0.7341, 0.0277
Average Respondent  22.48, 0, 0, 1.12, 3.35, 0 0.7541, 0.0417
Average Respondent  22.48, 1, 0, 1.12, 3.35, 0 0.8134, 0.1930
Rank-Sensitive (i) 22.48, 1, 0, 3, 5, 1 0.9678, 0.6248
Rank-Sensitive (ii) 40, 1, 0, 3, 5, 1 0.8178, 0.7087
Migrant type
Reference Individual 22.48, 0, 0, 0, 3.35, 1 0.7298, 0.2132
Average Respondent  22.48, 0, 0, 1.12, 3.35, 1 0.7498, 0.2272
Average Respondent  22.48, 1, 0, 1.12, 3.35, 1 0.8091, 0.3785
Rank-Sensitive (i) 22.48, 1, 0, 3, 5, 1 0.9678, 0.6248
Rank-Sensitive (ii) 40, 1, 0, 3, 5, 1 0.8178, 0.7087
Note: Xi = [Age, Gender, Partner, Job Title, Family Wealth, Migrant].
Denitions and summary statistics of socioeconomic variables are reported in Table 1.
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